What Do We Pay These People For?

Intelligence services and democracy are always a volatile mix. Operating in the shadows and immune to full public scrutiny there is always the danger, even likelihood, of such agencies pursuing an independent agenda. Moreover, away from the public spotlight it is far easier for errors to remain unchecked or even undetected.

This is made evident in CSIS' current debacle with the Mohamed Harkat case. It has come to light that Harkat was first held in custody under a security certificate in 2002, and since 2006 held under strict house arrest, on information provided by a person who on two subsequent occassions failed polygraph tests. CSIS (oops!) failed to inform the courts.

While CSIS is "reviewing its procedures" (i.e. covering its ass), the judge in the case, Mr. Justice Simon Noel believes that CSIS may have both lied and concealed information.

A little history is in order here. CSIS, and its watchdog, SIRC, were created in 1984 in response to deep and persistent problems with the Security Service of the RCMP. This was to be a more accountable intelligence service that would overcome the cultural rot that had become apparent in its predecessor.

Its budget is proportionally equal to the CIA's. It is not starved for resources. And it has the support of a government with a strong focus on security issues. In short, it has all that it needs to be an effective security service in a democracy.

Yet here we are. Again.

Despite the necessarily secretive nature of security work, SIRC must be seen at some point to have vigorously pursued this issue. And CSIS is still accountable to a minister, Public Safety Minister Peter Van Loan, who is in turn responsible to Parliament. The minister owes Parliament either an explanation or his resignation.