Interest Rates, Crowding Out and Inflation? No!

Martin Wolf of the Financial Times has added his considerable voice to those who insist that we focus on the problem at hand and on solutions that seem to be working. He tackles three particular concerns, rising interest rates, fiscal stimulus and inflation.

Fiscal stimulus, he insists, is not crowding out private investment, nor is it likely to any time soon. As he puts it

The argument advanced by opponents is either that fiscal policy is always unnecessary and ineffective or, as Prof Ferguson suggests, redundant, because this is not a “Great Depression”. Monetarists argue fiscal policy is always unnecessary, since monetary expansion does the trick. Economists who believe in “Ricardian equivalence” – after the early-19th-century economist David Ricardo – argue fiscal policy is ineffective, because households will offset any government dis-saving with their own higher savings.

Economists disagree fiercely on these points. My approach is “Keynesian”: in extreme moments, the excess of desired savings over investment soars. Again, monetary policy, while important, becomes less effective when interest rates are zero. It is then wise to wear both monetary belt and fiscal braces.

A deep recession proves there is a huge rise in excess desired savings at full employment, as Prof Krugman argues. At present, therefore, fiscal deficits are not crowding the private sector out. They are crowding it in, instead, by supporting demand, which sustains jobs and profits.

Prof Ferguson argues that fiscal expansion was unnecessary because this is only a mild recession. The question, however, is why it is only a mild recession, since precursors of a depression were surely present.

The answer, in part, is the aggressive monetary policies of central banks and the rescue of the financial system. But is that all? What would have happened if governments had decided to cut spending and raise taxes? One might disagree on how much deliberate fiscal loosening was needed. But one of the most important reasons this is not the Great Depression is that we have learnt a lesson from experience then, and in Japan in the 1990s: do not tighten fiscal policy too soon. Moreover, historically well-run economies are certainly able to support higher levels of public indebtedness very comfortably.

As regards interest rates, Wolf makes a convincing case that increasing yields on U.S. treasuries are simply a return to norms after a period of historical lows. This in turn is evidence that investment is moving from the safe haven of U.S. Treasuries as confidence returns. As Wolf describes it

What has happened is a sudden return to normality: after some turmoil, the yield on conventional US government bonds closed at 3.5 per cent last week, while the yield on Tips fell to 1.9 per cent. So expected inflation went to a level in keeping with Federal Reserve objectives, at close to 1.6 per cent. Much the same has happened in the UK, with a rise in expected inflation from a low of 1.3 per cent in March to 2.3 per cent. Fear of deflationary meltdown has gone. Hurrah!

Finally, Wolf makes the obvious case that moderate inflation is desirable, particularly when contrasted to the risks of deflation. Yet it also signals the need to think about an eventual "exit strategy." Drawing again on Wolf's own words

This is essentially the question of how to exit from current extreme policies. People need to believe that the extraordinarily aggressive monetary and fiscal policies of today will be reversed. If they do not believe this, there could well be a big upsurge in inflationary expectations long before the world economy has recovered. If that were to happen, policymakers would be caught in a painful squeeze and the world might indeed end up in 1970s-style stagflation.

The exceptional policies used to deal with extreme circumstances are working. Now, as a result, policymakers are walking a tightrope: on one side are premature withdrawal and a return to deep recession; on the other side are soaring inflationary expectations and stagflation. It is irresponsible to insist either on immediate tightening or on persistently loose policies. Both the US and the UK now risk the latter. But their critics risk making an equal and opposite mistake. The answer is both clear and tricky: choose sharp tightening, but not yet.

Intelligent public policy rather than ideological reaction are thus the key to emerging from this recession while avoiding some of the more dire consequences of the remedies. One hopes that we can this time avoid the pitfalls identified by Minsky and others that often make the cure at least as painful as the disease.