Tuesday, March 10, 2009

Send in the Clowns?

Remember when a trillion dollars was a lot of money? Well now you can also reminisce about when a Harvard MBA was a ticket to upper class respectability. In the Times today, A particularly egregious example is the schools intense focus on the Royal Bank of Scotland, now a ward of the state, as a paragon of management virtue. Key quote:
When I was a student at Harvard Business School, between 2004 and 2006, I recall a distinguished professor of organisational behaviour, Joel Podolny, telling us proudly of his work with Fred Goodwin at RBS. At the time, RBS looked like a corporate supermodel and Podolny was keen to trumpet his role in its transformation.
As we now know, however, the reality was quite different
Every trendy business school idea was being implemented, it seemed, while what really mattered – the bank’s risk assessment, cash flow and capital structure – was going to hell. To be fair, neither Podolny nor the authors of the case studies were finance professors, but it’s still pretty shocking that a school that purports to teach general management should fail to see the gaping problems at a firm they studied in such depth.
I have thought for years that many graduate professional programs (I hold an MPA) are finishing schools more concerned with imbuing graduates with the poise, confidence and the accoutrements of image as much as a solid foundation of knowledge and skills. The result is all too often arrogance unsupported by ability. In the current financial disaster, the results speak for themselves.

Monday, March 9, 2009

Thomas Ricks on Counterinsurgency

Local NPR affiliate, WNED, today replayed a talk given by Thomas Ricks, on the successes and failures of the surge in Iraq that began two years ago. The most interesting of his remarks were on the effects of the new counterinsurgency strategies being used, and how and where these are now succeding,

He indicated that there are three crucial lessons from this. First, controlling and ultimately ending the insurgency will ultimately be accomplished by the Iraqis with help from the Americans and others. Second, this will not be accomplished by military means alone, but instead by a judicious use of military force, financial incentives and most important by a rebuilding of the social fabric of Iraq over an extended period of time. And finally, and perhaps most important, this will involve direct engagement and negotiation with insurgents.

And America's role in this will be, and can only be one of support.

As I noted in an earlier post, this is also true in Afghanistan, as the Prime Minister noted last week. This does not mean the insurgency cannot be ended, it only means that we cannot defeat it militarily.

Will We All Pay for GM Pensions?

One of the questions that continues to haunt the big three auto makers, particularly GM, is what would happen to unfunded pension liabilities if the automaker were to enter into bankruptcy proceedings.

Under a regulatory provision introduced by the Rae government, GM was allowed to underfund its pension plan, or "fund it as a going concern" (not!) in return for contributions to Ontario's Pension Benefits Guarantee Fund. It currently contributes a laughable $5 million per year to a fund that already has a deficit of $102 million. This fund would guarantee $1000 per month to retirees if GM were to fail, also a laughable amount. It would, however, cost the fund billions, not a laughable amount, which the Ontario government would have to backstop.

Even with the historic concessions on pensions made yesterday by the CAW (without the consent or retirees), this continues to be a sword hanging over the head of GM and in fact all Ontarians.

Is this perhaps the chief motive behind the provincial government's willingness to provide massive assistance to the auto makers?

Krugman on Obama's Recovery Plans

The Cassandras are becoming the majority party.

In his New York Times column this morning, Paul Krugman unloads on the Obama administration about both its stimulus effort and its effort to rescue the financial system. On the stimulus front
[e]mployment has already fallen more in this recession than in the 1981-82 slump, considered the worst since the Great Depression. As a result, Mr. Obama’s promise that his plan will create or save 3.5 million jobs by the end of 2010 looks underwhelming, to say the least. It’s a credible promise — his economists used solidly mainstream estimates of the impacts of tax and spending policies. But 3.5 million jobs almost two years from now isn’t enough in the face of an economy that has already lost 4.4 million jobs, and is losing 600,000 more each month.
Thus the stimulus plan is too little, too late. Meanwhile, he argues that the effort to rescue the banking system is equally inadequate
As I read it, this dismissal [of nationalization] — together with the continuing failure to aonnounce any broad plans for bank restructuring — means that the White House has decided to muddle through on the financial front, relying on economic recovery to rescue the banks rather than the other way around. And with the stimulus plan too small to deliver an economic recovery ... well, you get the picture.
Krugman, this years economics Nobel laureate, has been something of a voice in the wilderness for more than a year, beginning with his talk of a liquidity trap early last year.

My fear, like his, is that the scope of this crisis is growing in a way that escapes us. We are responding, but seemingly to last week's problem, or as Krugman put it today
O.K., that’s a warning, not a prediction. But economic policy is falling behind the curve, and there’s a real, growing danger that it will never catch up.

Recession, Depression, What's in a Name?

Bloomberg has a depressing (pardon the pun) piece on their site this morning that draws on remarks from half a dozen or more prominent economists that together suggest that if we are not in a depression now (and we are not) then we certainly are facing the real possibility of one. Key quote:
Combined with collapsing house prices, the free-fall in the stock market will destroy $23 trillion worth of U.S. wealth, reckons Lawrence Lindsey, a former senior White House official who now heads his own consulting company in Arlington, Virginia.
To put this in perspective, world GDP in 2008 was about $60 trillion U.S.. So U.S. losses in wealth alone amount to almost 40% of world GDP. And we're not done yet. Debt deflation is a real possibility, unemployment is growing as fast as it ever has and we still have no real clue where all of the toxic assets are buried. If we are not staring into the abyss, we are surely sneaking a peak at it.

So are we in a depression? Stay tuned.

Sunday, March 8, 2009

Journalism 101

Listening to Michael Enright's show on CBC this morning, I was very surprised to hear that Prime Minister Harper had said on Farreed Zakaria's show last week that the Taliban could not be defeated. As I noted in a post last week, Harper said nothing of the sort. What he did say was that western military might alone would not defeat the Taliban, or any other insurgency, but that insurgencies such as this can be managed and controlled by competent and effective local governments aided by foreign powers. He further suggested that Canada might well have a role in making a contribution to this kind of transformation, though it would be very careful in assessing that role.

Again, I am amazed and depressed by the capacity of the MSM, and the CBC is certainly that, to get it wrong by putting their own spin on a story. If Enright is "the hardest working man in radio" as many of his fans describe him, then surely he, or one of assistants would have taken time to listen to the Zakaria interview. This is not an issue of left or right. Those in favor of military intervention have been just as guilty of inaccuracy and spin. It is simply an issue of separating fact from opinion and being honest about which is which.

Thursday, March 5, 2009

Can the U.S. Lead Us Out of This Crisis?

Martin Feldstein, former leader of the Reagan economics team and one of the leading economists in the U.S. has a deeply pessimistic piece on the Project Syndicate site today. So at a time when many are suggesting that this recession is no worse than the 1981-82 debacle, Feldstein argues that while the numbers may not yet be as bad, the nature of the recession is entirely different and much more frightening in that

[p]revious recessions were often characterized by excess inventory accumulation and overinvestment in business equipment. The economy could bounce back as those excesses were absorbed over time, making room for new investment. Those recoveries were also helped by interest rate reductions by the central bank.

This time, however, the fall in share prices and in home values has destroyed more than $12 trillion of household wealth in the United States, an amount equal to more than 75% of GDP. Previous reactions to declines in household wealth indicate that such a fall will cut consumer spending by about $500 billion every year until wealth is restored. While a higher household saving rate will help to rebuild wealth, it would take more than a decade of relatively high saving rates to restore what was lost.

This is a recession that will not resolve in the short term, or even in the foreseeable future, by itself. And as Paul Krugman has been arguing for some time, and as is now obvious, monetary policy has reached its limits, or as Krugman puts it, "it’s the zero lower bound, stupid"

As Feldstein notes, much of the massive stimulus package being implemented in the U.S. is in the form of tax cuts, which are likely to go into savings as households try to rebuild their balance sheets. And many of the public works projects will take years to implement. This, he suggests will require a further, equally sweeping stimulus package, but one much more targeted at immediate increases in demand.

The problem is that sooner or later, stimulative spending in the U.S. (and the rest of the world) will begin to push up interest rates, which could in turn choke off any recovery. Thus Feldstein closes on a note of uncertainty:
So it is not clear what will occur to reverse the decline in GDP and end the economic downturn. Will a sharp dollar depreciation cause exports to rise and imports to fall? Will a rapid rise in the inflation rate reduce the real value of government, household, and commercial debt, leading to lower saving and more spending? Or will something else come along to turn the economy around. Only time will tell.

Wednesday, March 4, 2009

How Stable are Canadian Banks?

With Canadian banks being praised throughout the world for their stability and soundness in the face of a worldwide financial crisis, it might seem churlish to raise pointed questions about their health. Yet there are a few questions that I think at least need to be considered.

The question of the health of the banking sector first arose for me with the Harper government's Extraordinary Financing Framework introduced in the January budget. This initiative has earmarked $200-billion largely for the purchase of bank assets. This is an astronomical sum even if, as the government claims, the assets purchased will be performing assets and that there will be no cost (it is thus not a fiscal matter) and perhaps even a profit.

The question this raises for me is why, if the banks are so healthy, do they need this amount of backing, particularly at a time when they do not seem particularly anxious to lend? Could it be that their balance sheets include assets whose value is at risk or uncertain? And is the government set to purchase (or have they already purchased) assets that might be a good deal less stellar than we have been led to believe?

In his column today in the Globe and Mail, Jim Stanford, economist for the CAW, strongly suggested that balance sheets are less than they seem, stating:
Believe me, if Canada's banks were truly stable, Ottawa wouldn't have pumped $200-billion into the system.
In another column in today's Globe, Fabrice Taylor reminded readers that whatever press the banks are getting, markets aren't buying it, as reflected in share prices. So what is on those balance sheets? And surely more important, how are they being valued?

It turns out that last October the accounting rules for banks were substantially altered by the Canada Accounting Standards Board. These changes allowed banks to reclassify many investments to which fair value or mark-to-market accounting rules had applied. And these changes were backdated to July 1, 2008, to allow their effects to be reflected in the fourth quarter earnings which now look so favorable.

What does this mean? It means that assets for which there is little or no market (many of which have been termed "toxic assets") can now be re-evaluated or removed from balance sheets, making the banks appear healthier than they really are. As Hugh Anderson of the Financial Post noted last fall,
It's quite possible that such reclassifications will enable banks to report substantial net income boosts from reversing previous writedowns. Simultaneously, assets off the balance sheets will grow.
So I have two questions. First, to what extent are these changes reflected in the banks surprisingly rosy outlook? And second, what is our government buying with its $200-billion?

Tuesday, March 3, 2009

Harper and the Taliban Insurgency

In an interview with CNN's Farreed Zakaria on Sunday, Prime Minister Stephen Harper spoke with surprising candor about the future of Canada's mission in Afghanistan. Although many sources, including the Globe and Mail, reported that he had claimed that the NATO effort could never defeat the Taliban insurgency, what he in fact said was quite a bit more nuanced.

Harper did in fact argue that Canada and its allies cannot simply "win by staying" and cannot on their own defeat the insurgency. He insisted, however, that we can bring about improvements, and he suggested that the most important improvement that might be made is the emergence of an honest and competent government that can "manage the insurgency" and govern capably. Success against the insurgency, he argued, must be indigenous, and the proper role for Canada and others must be to help bring about sufficient Afghan governance and military capacity to achieve such success. It is this, he insisted, that is the essential element of our engagement and ultimately our exit strategy.

The issue for Harper, therefore, is not "whether to stay or go" but "whether we are being successful" in building this local capacity. To my mind this is scarcely defeatist. It is simple common sense coupled with an accurate reading of history. Western democracies have seldom prevailed alone in foreign counterinsurgency efforts. And indeed such efforts have often destabilized the very societies mounting them. France in Algeria and the United States in Viet Nam are obvious examples.

John Nagl, a co-author with David Patraeus and others of the U.S. Army's widely regarded counterinsurgency field manual suggests that
[i]t is perhaps only a slight exageration to suggest that, on their own, foreign forces cannot defeat an insurgency; the best they can hope for is to create the conditions that will enable local forces to win it for them.
If this is the approach that an expanded U.S. role force in Afghanistan is going to take, and this would appear almost certain, then there is real hope that the type of success that Harper envisions will be realized. And if this is the case, then an argument can be made for our continued presence. However, I think Harper is right that if we are not making progress in this direction, then it might be better to recognize this and curtail our efforts.

Monday, March 2, 2009

Stanley Fish on Faith and Finance

As the financial crisis gains an ever tighter hold on our pocketbooks and thoughts, one of the questions that arises is where faith, for those who claim it, might intersect with finance.

There are some obvious if regrettable answers that are routinely offered, two of which are worth mentioning here.

On Oprah Winfrey today, the billionaire hostess was offering one such answer: advice on simplifying our lives as a virtuous response to tough economic times. This is all very good, but of course it might sound a bit paternalistic to those in the trenches of real economic hardship. Downsizing is a discipline that usually comes easier to those who have first managed to upsize.

A second answer is the desire on the part of many to see an approaching economic cataclysm as a chance to return to a world of Little House on the Prairie or The Waltons, 70s television depictions of families and communities pulling together in the face of scarcity and need. However, the result of these challenges is just as often family breakdown, violence, substance abuse and myriad other expressions of despair. And the strongest believers in the virtues of privation are again usually those least hurt by it.

The larger problem is that both of these assume an ability to forge our own answers or solutions to financial adversity. In a brief essay on his New York Times blog, Stanley Fish engages this from a more original and I believe much more productive angle. He contrasts what he calls "a Protestant linking of thrift and virtue", the view that informs the two answers described above, with a more tragic, but ultimately redemptive view of our inability to avoid or transcend our ultimate bankruptcy, financial or otherwise, the recognition of which brings us to God and so to Grace.

One view, he argues, sees us redeemed financially by our own efforts. It is as if in exercising our strength and virtue we are doing God's work ourselves. And our faith is mostly in ourselves, whether individually or collectively. The other sees us as humbled by our inability to redeem ourselves, financially or otherwise and thus unable to rely on ourselves. It is here, says Fish, that many turn to God. And this, he says, is the beginning of wisdom.

I would suggest that, whatever our conscious motivations or rationalizations, the first path is always one of idolatry -- worshiping our ability, virtue and financial resources. The second offers the only real possiblity for faith and thus for real redemption. Admitting our powerlessness, we look beyond ourselves.

This, of course, is the great insight of the recovery movement that first emerged with Alcoholics Anonymous in the midst of the despair of the great depression of the 1930s. But when all of the rhetoric and rationalization of religion is stripped away, this is also the message of the Gospel. We are bankrupt, though some experience the pain of this more than others. And we are more often than not blind to this. Yet any belief in and reliance on our own ability and virtue proves to be worse than useless -- it hides from us the true nature of our situation. It alienates us from each other. And in doing so it alienates us from God.

Thus in this crisis, faith in our individual strengths or the collective capacities of our institutions is a blind alley. Bringing this back to questions of economics, Fish closes out his argument as follows:

This economy, in which funds depleted are endlessly replenished, is underwritten by a power so great and beneficent that it turns failures into treasures. Some economists identify that power as the market and ask us to have faith in it. God might be a better candidate.