Eisenhower and Peace

From the 100 Days blog at the NYT, some thoughts on what we might learn from Eisenhower's approach to Korea.

Before his nomination he visited Korea, and while he had campaigned on victory and unification, he returned convinced that peace negotiations were the only realistic approach. As Jean Edward Smith tells it

Ike spent three days in Korea. He conferred with his old friends, Gen. Mark Clark and Gen. James Van Fleet, talked to division and regimental commanders, and ate C-rations at the front with G.I.’s from the 15th Infantry — Eisenhower’s old regiment. Most significantly, he flew along the battle line, roughly the 38th Parallel, in an artillery observation plane (the military equivalent of a Piper Cub) for a good look at the terrain . . .[and] he returned to the United States determined to make peace.

It is particularly telling the Ike pursued peace over the heads of his most senior advisors as well as leaders in congress. In a speach where he made his intentions public, he declared

Every gun that is fired, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are notclothed….A world that begins to witness the rebirth of trust among nations can find its way to a peace that is neither partial nor punitive…. The first great step along this way must be the conclusion of an honorable armistice in Korea.

A particularly poignant sentiment for Easter Sunday. Because he had experienced the true horrors of war, Eisenhower was able to understand the precious value of peace and pursued it tenaciously despite opposition. When peace was achieved, quite quickly as it turned out,

Eisenhower ignored the criticism. “The war is over,” he told press secretary James Hagerty. “I hope my son is going to come home soon.”

Would that our Canadian generals' bellicose statements in the lead up to the Afghan mission have been tempered by the same understanding and compassion.

Journalism 101

Listening to Michael Enright's show on CBC this morning, I was very surprised to hear that Prime Minister Harper had said on Farreed Zakaria's show last week that the Taliban could not be defeated. As I noted in a post last week, Harper said nothing of the sort. What he did say was that western military might alone would not defeat the Taliban, or any other insurgency, but that insurgencies such as this can be managed and controlled by competent and effective local governments aided by foreign powers. He further suggested that Canada might well have a role in making a contribution to this kind of transformation, though it would be very careful in assessing that role.

Again, I am amazed and depressed by the capacity of the MSM, and the CBC is certainly that, to get it wrong by putting their own spin on a story. If Enright is "the hardest working man in radio" as many of his fans describe him, then surely he, or one of assistants would have taken time to listen to the Zakaria interview. This is not an issue of left or right. Those in favor of military intervention have been just as guilty of inaccuracy and spin. It is simply an issue of separating fact from opinion and being honest about which is which.

Harper and the Taliban Insurgency

In an interview with CNN's Farreed Zakaria on Sunday, Prime Minister Stephen Harper spoke with surprising candor about the future of Canada's mission in Afghanistan. Although many sources, including the Globe and Mail, reported that he had claimed that the NATO effort could never defeat the Taliban insurgency, what he in fact said was quite a bit more nuanced.

Harper did in fact argue that Canada and its allies cannot simply "win by staying" and cannot on their own defeat the insurgency. He insisted, however, that we can bring about improvements, and he suggested that the most important improvement that might be made is the emergence of an honest and competent government that can "manage the insurgency" and govern capably. Success against the insurgency, he argued, must be indigenous, and the proper role for Canada and others must be to help bring about sufficient Afghan governance and military capacity to achieve such success. It is this, he insisted, that is the essential element of our engagement and ultimately our exit strategy.

The issue for Harper, therefore, is not "whether to stay or go" but "whether we are being successful" in building this local capacity. To my mind this is scarcely defeatist. It is simple common sense coupled with an accurate reading of history. Western democracies have seldom prevailed alone in foreign counterinsurgency efforts. And indeed such efforts have often destabilized the very societies mounting them. France in Algeria and the United States in Viet Nam are obvious examples.

John Nagl, a co-author with David Patraeus and others of the U.S. Army's widely regarded counterinsurgency field manual suggests that

[i]t is perhaps only a slight exageration to suggest that, on their own, foreign forces cannot defeat an insurgency; the best they can hope for is to create the conditions that will enable local forces to win it for them.

If this is the approach that an expanded U.S. role force in Afghanistan is going to take, and this would appear almost certain, then there is real hope that the type of success that Harper envisions will be realized. And if this is the case, then an argument can be made for our continued presence. However, I think Harper is right that if we are not making progress in this direction, then it might be better to recognize this and curtail our efforts.