Showing posts with label accounting rules. Show all posts
Showing posts with label accounting rules. Show all posts

Friday, April 24, 2009

More on Minsky


On Wednesday, I noted that I am revisiting some of Minsky's work, and that I will comment on his work from time to time.

One of Minsky's key arguments in Stabilizing an Unstable Economy is that what he calls "Big Government" plays two roles in alleviating the recurrent crises that plague capitalism in its current guise. First, there is fiscal action both deliberate and automatic as stabilizers kick in. Second, is the role of central banks as lenders of last resort.

And one of the results of the second role is that an implicit floor is placed on prices of financial assets. This, for Minsky, is critical, as it means that as balance sheets deteriorate during a financial crisis, financial institutions are not forced to sell assets at distressed prices. Commentators have referred to this as the Greenspan or Geithner "put", but it is clear from Minsky that this has been a feature of central banking for at least a century.

What strikes me is that if this is the case, then perhaps (it pains me to say this) the changes to fair value accounting rules might make some sense. And they might make some sense because, given this implicit asset price floor, they closer reflect reality. As Minksy notes, in every financial crisis since the late 60s, central banks have intervened to prop up asset prices. If this too is an (almost) automatic stabilizer, then asset prices at a time of crisis should reflect this.

Saturday, April 11, 2009

Those Pesky Accounting Standards -- Now Europe

The Economist reports today that the IASB, the body that regulates accounting standards in Europe is under political pressure to loosen fair-value accounting standards, particularly those known as "mark to market". We have, of course, already seen this in Canada and the U.S.. As the Economist describes it
On April 2nd, after a bruising encounter with Congress, America’s Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) rushed through rule changes. These gave banks more freedom to use models to value illiquid assets and more flexibility in recognising losses on long-term assets in their income statements. Bob Herz, the FASB’s chairman, decried those who “impugn our motives”. Yet bank shares rose and the changes enhance what one lobbying group politely calls “

European ministers instantly demanded that the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) do likewise. The IASB says it does not want to be “piecemeal”, but the pressure to fold when it completes its overhaul of rules later this year is strong. On April 1st Charlie McCreevy, a European commissioner, warned the IASB that it did “not live in a political vacuum” but “in the real world” and that Europe could yet develop different rules.

So the rules change, and as this weeks experience shows, banks achieve instant profitability and are suddenly able to fully participate in credit markets. Isn't accounting fun! A stroke of the pen moves them from insolvency to darling of the market! (Warning: don't try this at home.)

Banks worldwide have suggested fair-value proponents are on the wrong planet. However, the Economist throws its considerable weight behind the argument that
[i]t was banks that were on the wrong planet, with accounts that vastly overvalued assets. Today they argue that market prices overstate losses, because they largely reflect the temporary illiquidity of markets, not the likely extent of bad debts. The truth will not be known for years. But banks’ shares trade below their book value, suggesting that investors are sceptical. And dead markets partly reflect the paralysis of banks which will not sell assets for fear of booking losses, yet are reluctant to buy all those supposed bargains.

Friday, April 10, 2009

Those Amazing, Magic Bank Profits

Slate is reporting today what the markets told us yesterday: U.S. banks are somehow returning to profitability. But not so fast.

Scroll back less than two weeks to Congressional pressure on the Financial Accounting Standards Board to retreat on fair-value accounting, particularly mark-to-market requirements. On March 30, Bloomberg reported that
Four days after U.S. lawmakers berated Financial Accounting Standards Board Chairman Robert Herz and threatened to take rulemaking out of his hands, FASB proposed an overhaul of fair-value accounting that may improve profits at banks such as Citigroup Inc. by more than 20 percent.
So now, Wells Fargo is reporting a 27% rise in profits. As Howard Cosell used to say: amazing!

Of course, as I noted on March 4, Canadian banks achieved a similar miraculous return to profitability following changes in fair value accounting standards, issued last fall but backdated to the summer, so that fourth quarter profits would shine.

What I cannot understand is how and why sophisticated investors believe this. Putting lipstick on the pig of toxic assets does not alter their pig-like character.

Tuesday, March 10, 2009

Bernanke on Valuation

In a speech that helped drive markets upward today, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke talked, in part, about the problem of valuing assets, a problem that to my mind lies at the very heart of the crisis in the financial system. Long story short, he insisted that valuation is a problem because of the competing issues of procyclicality and transparency -- in plain English, between driving the banks deeper into insolvency and telling the truth. Key passage:
The ongoing move by those who set accounting standards toward requirements for improved disclosure and greater transparency is a positive development that deserves full support. However, determining appropriate valuation methods for illiquid or idiosyncratic assets can be very difficult, to put it mildly. Similarly, there is considerable uncertainty regarding the appropriate levels of loan loss reserves over the cycle. As a result, further review of accounting standards governing valuation and loss provisioning would be useful, and might result in modifications to the accounting rules that reduce their procyclical effects without compromising the goals of disclosure and transparency. Indeed, work is underway on these issues through the Financial Stability Forum, and the results of that work may prove useful for U.S. policymakers.
Surely there are better ways to support credit markets than to fudge the numbers on the real health of the banks. Bernanke seems to suggest this, but is short on details. Moreover, markets are not fooled, as reflected in dropping share prices. And regulators surely understand how a lack of transparency precludes effective supervision. If the emporer is naked, we would save ourselves a lot of trouble if we just told him.

Wednesday, March 4, 2009

How Stable are Canadian Banks?

With Canadian banks being praised throughout the world for their stability and soundness in the face of a worldwide financial crisis, it might seem churlish to raise pointed questions about their health. Yet there are a few questions that I think at least need to be considered.

The question of the health of the banking sector first arose for me with the Harper government's Extraordinary Financing Framework introduced in the January budget. This initiative has earmarked $200-billion largely for the purchase of bank assets. This is an astronomical sum even if, as the government claims, the assets purchased will be performing assets and that there will be no cost (it is thus not a fiscal matter) and perhaps even a profit.

The question this raises for me is why, if the banks are so healthy, do they need this amount of backing, particularly at a time when they do not seem particularly anxious to lend? Could it be that their balance sheets include assets whose value is at risk or uncertain? And is the government set to purchase (or have they already purchased) assets that might be a good deal less stellar than we have been led to believe?

In his column today in the Globe and Mail, Jim Stanford, economist for the CAW, strongly suggested that balance sheets are less than they seem, stating:
Believe me, if Canada's banks were truly stable, Ottawa wouldn't have pumped $200-billion into the system.
In another column in today's Globe, Fabrice Taylor reminded readers that whatever press the banks are getting, markets aren't buying it, as reflected in share prices. So what is on those balance sheets? And surely more important, how are they being valued?

It turns out that last October the accounting rules for banks were substantially altered by the Canada Accounting Standards Board. These changes allowed banks to reclassify many investments to which fair value or mark-to-market accounting rules had applied. And these changes were backdated to July 1, 2008, to allow their effects to be reflected in the fourth quarter earnings which now look so favorable.

What does this mean? It means that assets for which there is little or no market (many of which have been termed "toxic assets") can now be re-evaluated or removed from balance sheets, making the banks appear healthier than they really are. As Hugh Anderson of the Financial Post noted last fall,
It's quite possible that such reclassifications will enable banks to report substantial net income boosts from reversing previous writedowns. Simultaneously, assets off the balance sheets will grow.
So I have two questions. First, to what extent are these changes reflected in the banks surprisingly rosy outlook? And second, what is our government buying with its $200-billion?